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IMF stabilisation and structural adjustment in sub-Saharan Africa:
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Reginald Green
The International Monetary Fund is often charged
with imposing austerity. This is a misconception...
the austerity born of adjustment must be compared
with the alternatives.
J. de Laroisiere,
Managing Director, IMF, 1984
The crisis in Africa in recent years is overwhelmingly
the product of external shocks . . Without the
heavy post-1978 blows or, given those blows, with
adequate international buffers against them, the
majority of African economies would not be sliding
backward as they are now doing.
G. K. Helleiner, 1985
We must look our mistakes in the face if we are to
avoid repeating them.
Rui Baltasar,
Finance Minister, Mozambique
Insufficient financing leads to unwarranted
exchange rate depreciation, restriction or debt
default.
Onno Ruding, Bank-Fund
Interim Committee Chairman
Prologue
The likelihood of a uniform and unconditional answer
to the title of this article applying to all sub-Saharan
African economies is negligible. Botswana over 1982-
83 operated an IMF-type stabilisation strategy -
albeit without using any ¡MF resources or actually
concluding a standby agreement. This was highly
successful in reducing demand and imports as well as
in shifting financing patterns to bolster reserves.
Because exports recovered rapidly and the cuts came
after a period of sustained increases in output, real
wages and imports, the duration and cost of austerity
were low (see Charles Harvey's article in thisBulletin).
Over 1974-79 Rhodesia (as it then was) ran an ¡MF
type stabilisation programme - for different reasons
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also without using Fund resources. This programme
restored current account balance, held inflation below
world levels and kept the recurrent budget more or less
in balance. But because the external environment did
not improve, GDP per capita, real consumption, real
savings and investment fell year by year while the
structure of production which had changed rapidly
over 1965-74 - ceased to adjust [Kadhani and Green,
1985]. Zambia's successive ¡MF programmes have at
least endured and in that sense are more successful
than the majority. But the current account has not
been restored to balance, nor have trade arrears been
reduced significantly or any base laid to restore real
output without an immediate re-emergence of gross
external imbalance, despite draconic cuts in real
wages, government per capita spending and imports.
As a result of success in the sense of continuity but
failure to regain external balance, ¡MF debt service is
now of the order of 25 per cent of export earnings. This
is one of the main problems to be surmounted if
external balance is to be achieved.
The diversity of result illustrated here is not surprising.
The Botswana case is very near the classic model in
which a short term macro-monetary stabilisation
programme should work if undertaken promptly,
except that the imbalances were caused by supply
reduction not increased demand. The economy was
strong. A record of high rates of real increase in both
wages and public services for over a decade made cuts
uncomfortable rather than crippling. With a high ratio
of imports to GDP and negligible import control, cuts
in imports were likely to follow fairly automatically
from nominal demand restraint and to have low
impact on real domestic production. The external
shock (i.e. export quotas for diamonds which forced
export cuts) could be expected to be - and was - self
reversing.
The Rhodesian case is intermediate. The economy was
fairly strong and the response to the 1973-74 changes
in global economic conditions fairly prompt. But,
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because of a low ratio of imports to GDP and imports
dominated by inputs into production and investment
with few final consumer goods, import cuts imposed
much larger cuts in domestic production. As the
external economic environment did not recover, the
only way to maintain external and internal balance
was to reduce output and capacity utilisation: not once
and for all but on a sinking equilibrium path.
Zambia - like Rhodesia in 1974 - was hit by the
collapse of a metal boom. Its economy was already
weakened by the costs of the Rhodesian rebellion, the
rise in oil and grain prices and distortions in the
production structure arising from its previous export
boom (see Philip Daniel's article in this Bulletin). The
negative impact of the shift in terms of trade on
effective GDP and real government revenue was so
large that even a relatively high initial import to GDP
ratio did not give room for cuts adequate to restore
either external or fiscal balance, and the cuts made
caused a significant reduction in domestic output. As
real metal prices never recovered, and import cuts
eroded the export base, the structural position
worsened if anything.
IMF Resource Access and Adjustment:
Necessary? Sufficient? Neither?
What is more surprising are the questions the three
cases raise in respect to using ¡MF resources.
Botswana did not need to - although it could have
done so, and given the brief duration of its imbalanced
nine per cent loan over six years (the basic IMF terms)
would not have created severe debt management
problems.
Rhodesia, as a non-recognised entity, could not
borrow from the ¡MF - although it probably would
have had it been able to. Given the 1974-79 record, in
retrospect it is hard to see that - say - $250 mn
would have done anything more than worsen the
medium term external balance. As the IMF debt
service/export ratio demonstrates, Zambia has found
that short term, semi-commercial interest rate credit is
not the road to structural adjustment, any more than
are commercial arrears.
The ¡MF has always been quite clear in stating that it is
not in the development business. ¡ri cases lasting
longer or requiring more resources than the first credit
tranche and Compensatory Finance Facility (to offset
export declines) the question is whether the ¡MF is an
appropriate source of interim finance at all for low and
middle income SSA economies. Unless they can expect
a natural recovery of import capacity from exports
there is reason to suspect that the answer is no.
The argument may well not apply to countries with
idle capacity and/or domestic oriented production
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susceptible to being shifted to exports if domestic
demand falls - e.g. Italy, Turkey, Brazil. There,
devaluation and demand cuts should lead to fairly
rapid export increases and an approach to trade
balance (including invisibles), even if at substantial
cost. For countries whose exports are dominated by
specific low price primary products with low income
elasticity, it is unclear that devaluation and domestic
demand cuts do much to restore balance [cf Helleiner
1984; Loxley 1984] èxcept at the cost of a very high loss
in domestic output, and perhaps also a falling
equilibrium. Certainly the input supply and capital
requirements needed to maintain existing export bases
have at times fallen victim to IMF programmes, and
the investment needed to build up new ones is even
more vulnerable. It is also unlikely to produce
substantial results inside the three-year life of an ¡MF
drawing programme.
Technical, Not Ideological
This line of critique is not ideological but technical. In
fact the ideological element in IMF-SSA relations is
rather overstressed. The crux of the argument is:
political survivability (as recently in the Sudan); the
proper time frame for adjustment; the starting point in
structural adjustment (i.e. real supply or monetary
demand); the virtues of shock loading costs at the start
versus phasing them parallel to benefits; and similar
issues which are not usefully seen as having any clear
relationship to ideology.
There are issues which can be defined as ultimately
ideological, e.g. free versus managed markets,
privatisation, income transfers and distribution.
However, in practice most actual debates turn on
degrees and balances not either/or choices, and are
very often a mixing of ideological, technical and
factual issues. The two most consistent strands of IMF
policy prescription: that devaluation is a good all
purpose medicine' taken in large doses and that
consumer subsidies are always highly undesirable,2
simply do not add up to any standard political,
There is one major, surprising exception in SSA. The ¡MF has not
- so far as is known - pressed the CFA franc zone countries to
devalue. As the CFA/French franc parity was set nearly 40 years
ago at a rate overvaluing the (then) colonial franc; the French franc
has not usually been viewed as undervalued; most CFA country
inflation rates have been above that of France and the CFA
economies have quite divergent structures, trends and degrees of
external and fiscal imbalance, this exception is a rather intriguing
one. So too is the ability - before ¡979 nd to a degree since - of
many of these states to combine overvalued currencies and liberal
import and capital transfer regulations with external balance and
export growth.
2 SSA is a somewhat strange choice of location to give general priority
to this theme. The region has by far the lowest ratio of consumer
transfer payments in government expenditure in the world and in
few cases consumer subsidies are a major cause of government
recurrent budget deficits.
political-economic or economic ideology. Certainly
the IMF is prone to be sure it knows best, to generalise
from a limited number of cases, to be selective in the
use of data (especially when available data are
fragmentary, conflicting and of doubtful accuracy)
and rigid in presenting its case, not least in its
occasional dialogues with friendly critics [see Killick
ed. 19841. That is in a real sense an ideology, but not
what is normally meant by ideological controversy
about IMF prescriptions, nor is it the main topic of
this article.
The IMF Model of Economic Imbalance and
Its Cure
The IMF operates on a relatively uniform set of
assumptions about the causes of external imbalance
and the structures and response patterns of
economies. Some of these are fairly explicit, others are
implicit in lending policies [see Williamson 19821,
others emerge only from looking at a set of
programmes or detailed discussion which arises in
programme negotiations with IMF staff.
The basic assumptions of the IMF model can be
summarised as follows:
the primary cause of external and internal
imbalance is a major and usually sudden increase in
the use of real resources;
demand reduction can restore balance by cutting
back on recent personal (especially wage earner)
and public (especially transfer payment) con-
sumption while allowing rising real investment to
take care of bolstering supply. Consequent falls in
output will below, brief and not in key areas of the
economy;
room exists for rapid export expansion by
reactivating capacity made idle by overvalued
exchange rates and/or shifting capacity freed by
reduced demand from the domestic to the export
market;
higher import prices (from devaluation) combined
with reduced market intervention/rationing of
imports lead to lower import levels and to
improved allocation of imports and production;
the economy is relatively flexible and internally
integrated without major real gaps or sectoral
fragmentation (in one sense this provides the basis
for the two previous assumptions);
nominal price changes can be expected to lead to
real relative price changes (externally and inter-
nally) and therefore to improve allocative
efficiency while reducing demand. Apparently the
assumption includes the view that falling nominal
demand can be achieved and will choke off
inflation;
reductions in demand and market intervention and
new relative price ratios (including the exchange
rate) should be carried out over a brief period to
secure maximum shock effect toward rebalancing,
with fairly modest subsequent steps to undo
reversals caused by inflation;
restoration of balance and return to growth can be
achieved in a relatively brief period - three yearsjudging from the lending programme limit -
because of assumed flexibility and the ability to
raise exports sharply. Therefore given the
assumption that imbalance follows sharp increases
in real resource use, temporary cutbacks from
'shock' adjustment phasing will not pose major
problems, since they will soon be followed by
renewed gains.
SSA's Post-1979 Economic Malaise and
the Model
Whether these assumptions are or are not reasonably
accurate, either in general or in specific cases, is not an
ideological question but a mixed empirical/judgement
one. A substantial body of writing [e.g. in Williamson
1983; Killick 1984; Dell Lawrence and Helleiner 1985]
raises such questions in respect to most developing
economies. However, the concern of the present
article is narrower. In SSA the following would appear
to be the case with respect to the IMF's assumptions:
I. in a majority of cases the primary (and certainly the
immediate) cause of imbalance was a fall in real
resource availability triggered by an external shock
(e.g. terms of trade, quantitative decline in the
demand for exports, drought) or a war (civil or
external). High rates of increase in real con-
sumption before the sudden emergence of major
imbalance are exceptions (e.g. Botswana, in the
very short run but not over a five year perspective,
Zimbabwe);
2. demand reductions, therefore, will not merely
reverse recent increases but cut into basic levels of
resource use. Because profits and foreign finance
are typically low and falling, private investment is
likely to be cut sharply. Cuts in government
resource use large enough to restore recurrent
balanced budgets will need to go much further than
subsidies, because real revenue falls very fast with
demand constraint and interest payments rise
rapidly from both the stabilisation finance and the
initial deficit. Consequential falls in domestic
output are likely to be several times greater than
imports cuts and - whether market or intervent-
ionist methods of constraint are used - import
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Imbalance triggered by external shocks.
cuts are unlikely to be concentrated on final
consumption goods as opposed to operating,
maintenance or investment inputs;3
3. little room exists for rapid export expansion.
Physical constraints, often exacerbated by import
cuts in stabilisation programmes both in agri-
culture and in related processing and transport, are
one factor, and global (as well as domestic) price
incentives are another. Scope for switching
domestic production to export markets is usually
limited (Zimbabwe's manufacturing sector is a
partial exception) even if foreign exchange to
maintain output is available. Many traditional
exports are doubtful candidates for rapid increases
in output for price elasticity reasons [see Martin
Godfrey's article in this Bulletin] and new ones are
either hard to identify or will require substantial
There are exceptions. Hotswana's stabilisation programme's market
force operated real import reduction did centre on consumer
amenity goods. Tanzania's interventionist allocation of imports has
virtually eliminated consumer goods other than grain, pharma-
ceuticals and the 15 to 20 per cent of petroleum products
corresponding to non-business car use and household kerosine
consumption.
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amounts of time, finance and foreign exchange to
develop;
in cases with a history of detailed import licensing,
major liberalisation is inconsistent with reducing
import levels because the true price elasticity is very
low - especially for amenity consumer goods.
Market incentives (i.e. quick, easy, relatively high
profits) seem to result in liberalisation,4 shifting the
balance of imports away from maintenance and
production inputs toward consumer amenities.
This is not necessarily an allocational improve-
ment, as it is likely to maximise the cost of any
import reduction and, indeed, to erode the future
export base;
most SSA economies are fragile, with limited
domestic integration and very substantial pro-
duction, maintenance and investment input gaps
which can be breached only by imports. In many
i.e., this criticism might not apply to selective liberalisation of
categories of goods useable only for production and maintenance or
for specific producers, or classes of producers, imports of goods to
be used in further production and/or capacity maintenance/
rehabilitation.
cases import to GDP ratios have falten not because
of import substitution but because of sheer absence
of foreign exchange leading to massive capacity
underutilisation and undermaintenance;
nominal price changes tend to be overtaken rapidly
by inflation especially when initial changes are
large, partly because of cost plus pricing and partly
because of physical constraints. The only
exceptions appear to be reductions in real wages
and salaries and effective grower prices for export
or industrial crops.5 In general, sharp increases in
nominal grower prices, in government or parastatal
charges and in basic import prices (e.g. fuel, food)
promote inflation rather than redistribution, or
any alteration in the level or pattern of output;
rapid changes at the macro-monetary level tend to
have both unexpected and undesired side effects
(e.g. credit ceilings which block the use of available
export production capacity, government budget
cuts which immobilise extension personnel) and to
generate cumulative inflationary forces which
largely or wholly offset them in a brief period of
time. Further, by front end loading the costs they
create problems of acceptance, morale and
programme survivability which affect likely
stabilisation and production outcomes even if they
are social and political rather than narrowly
economic.6
given the initial (and unreversed) loss of command
over the dominant role of real resources in most
SSA cases of extreme imbalance, the rigidity of
their economies and the poor prospects for high,
sustained export growth, few can achieve a stable
base for renewed growth within three years without
sharp increases in net foreign exchange availability
sustained over three to seven years with limited and
phased increases in their debt servicing burden.
Certain details of, or emphases within, this sketch are
doubtless controversial. But it is by and large the
pattern which emerges from a range of studies [IDS
1983; World Bank 1984; JDP 19851. Even the World
Bank's Accelerated Development Report [World Bank
1981] did not project any significant rise in real GDP
per capita between 1979-1989 for low income African
countries. Its 1984 Programme [World Bank 1984]
projects typical 1990 levels of real output per capita
well below those of 1980 and, implicitly at least, below
those of 1970 in a substantial number of cases.
For domestic food or artisanal crops a low nominal (or real) official
grower price leads primarily to more parallel marketing, not relative
price shifts in favour of consumers and against growers.
e.g.. wage earners do respond to economic incentives and
disincentives. Sharp and unreversed real wage falls lead to
cumulative productivity, morale and presence at work losses and
cumulatively rising conflict with supervisors, employers and the
state. None of these can be expected to enhance the prospects for
successful stabilisation, however defined.
It would be inaccurate to say that the IMF is totally
impervious to SSA realities. It does in specific cases
recognise the problem of fitting its time frame to that
needed to achieve results in some SSA economies. It
does see barriers to rapid import liberalisation and to
cutting imports below current levels (indeed several
programmes - either actual or under negotiation -
specify raising import levels as a key objective). It does
not uniformly advocate trade surpluses as a viable
short term target [but see Bhatia and Tahari, 1984].
But these appear to be ad hoc adjustments in specific
cases and are not based on any general reappraisal or
critique of the underlying assumptions of the Fund's
approach to stabilisation.
Non-Questions and Questions -
Querying the ¡MF model does not imply asserting that
one can avoid adjustment; that domestic policy played
no role in causing or exacerbating imbalances; that
prices do not matter; nor that additional access to
foreign exchange without coherent domestic strategies
can be a sufficient condition for stabilisation,
rehabilitation and recovery. Resource use must, by
one means or another, be adjusted to resource
availability. Domestic policy has caused some
situations of imbalance and worsened most. Delayed
response to the 1979 crisis (based in many caes on the
not then unreasonable view that the world economy in
1979-83 would resemble 1974-78) has greatly
heightened problems both of stabilisation and
structural adjustment. Getting the prices wrong is a
credo with few adherents and, if anything, most SSA
governments now place more weight on getting
nominal prices right than this as a single instrument
can bear. Coherent and sustained strategies related to
actual structures and possibilities are necessary for
additional access to resources to have sustained
positive results (as the Sudan, Zaire and Zambia cases
demonstrate graphically).7
However, a series of questions does flow from
comparison of the model's assumptions and existing
scenarios and structures in SSA:
If stabilisation is required basically because of falls on
the supply side, should structural adjustment not
focus on restoring command over resources, parti-
cularly by higher capacity utilisation, enhanced
maintenance/rehabilitation, expansion of import
earning capacity (i.e. exports) and critical import
saving capacity (i.e. import substitution) rather than
on further cuts in demand? The view that some
All three have embarked on - if not sustained - numerous
externally designed and funded stabilisation and recovery
strategies. Equally each is among the relatively few large SSA
economies whose gross inflows of aid, IMF funds and non-
concessional finance in real per capita terms are apparently
markedly higher in the early 1980s than a decade ago.
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austerity programmes which centre on demand cuts
provide inadequate stimulation for export employment
and growth (i.e. structural adjustment) is widely held
[AED 1985].
Given rigidities in economic structures and poor
prospects for currently dominant exports, should
export promotion and import substitution be seen as
alternatives, or opposite sides of the same coin in
restoring external balance in a manner consistent with
resumed expansion of output?
In the light of numerous real constraints - physical,
personnel, institutional - can a rehabilitation
strategy best be built down from a macro-monetary
policy pattern or up from a set of real, sectoral
programmes (a question which overlaps with the
relative emphasis given to supply expansion/demand
curtailment)?
Can a stabilisation strategy succeed (in the sense of
enduring) unless it either really does relate to largely
self reversing problems or is the first stage in a longer
term structural adjustment programme to which its
short term stabilisation targets are subordinated?
What time frames and types of finance are appropriate
for integrated stabilisation/structural adjustment
packages?
- And Some Consequential TechnicaL
Criticisms
The question of time frames has already been raised.
However, the timing assumptions apparently under-
lying IMF programmes raise further questions. IMF
trigger clause targets usually assume empirical
improvement on monetary and fiscal as well as
external balance heads within three months of the
submission of a letter of intent. This appears to assume
either a very powerful expectations effect (given the
prevalence of short-lived programme attempts in SSA,
this is somewhat unlikely) or a near absence of lags
between fund release and results. In the context of SSA
this is rarely plausible. Ordering, producing/dispatch-
ing and delivering imports relating to current
production and maintenance is likely to take three to
five months, use in production another two to four
months (longer for agricultural inputs), distribution
and sale one to three months more and collection of
revenue by government or additional cash flow by
enterprises to reduce bank borrowing a further one to
three months (longer for profits taxes). This adds up to
a total of seven to 15 months, with 12 probably a not
untypical distributed lag from fund release to the
achievement of substantial results for production and
the monetary/fiscal balance.
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Phasing and sequencing raises similar issues -
particularly when physical or real (as opposed to
monetary and nominal) constraints exist. For
example, if the main purchases peasants wish to make
are consumer and construction manufactures, and the
key constraints on their producing more are inputs
(e.g. seeds, fertilisers, hoes) then until these are more
readily available neither incentives for, nor real
possibilities (apart from better weather) of enhanced
peasant production are feasible, irrespective of what
nominal price changes are introduced. If the supply
gaps are the result of 20 to 40 per cent of capacity local
production rates, because the 20 per cent to 40 per cent
of ex-factory cost which represents imports cannot be
met (a not atypical set of conditions in larger African
economies) then foreign exchange allocations (and a
source from which to allocate) for industry may be the
logical - and near necessary - first step toward
restoring or raising agricultural output.
Similarly, whether it is more effective to phase in
(ratchet) relative price changes (of foreign exchange or
grower prices or electricity or fuel or staple food or
wages) depends to a large extent on what the results of
rapid changes would be in terms of dislocation and of
generating forces which reversed the initial changes.
Because many SSA economies are very weak, 'shock'
cures may be beyond their capacity to withstand, while
the lags between, e.g. nominal changes in grower
prices and more goods for growers to buy, may be so
long as to cause inflation, which would reverse the
relative price incentive before production could
respond.
Selectivity - especially in resource cuts - is an area in
which the IMF cannot be accused of monolithic
consistency. It argues first, at a general level, that one
cut is as good as another, second, that cuts should be
ranked according to their efficiency at reducing
external imbalance, and third, that consumption
subsidies, wage earner consumption, production
subsidies, general government expenditure and
enterprise fixed investment stand in that order as
targets.
There is much to be said against excessive wages and
large recurrent budget deficits, but it is by no means
generally true in SSA that they have a high import (or
potential export) content. Nor is it evident that cutting
them would reduce credit and inflationary pressures
more effectively than cutting profits and investment
(Rhodesian experience would suggest the reverse).
Further, in much of SSA diversion of imports from
additional, unselective capacity increases - which
will be largely inoperable because of import
strangulation - to operating, maintenance and
rehabilitation inputs directed to existing capacity
would appear to be a priority for stabilisation and
Lack of capita/forces capacity underuti/isarion.
consolidation of exports and government financial
balance, as well as of production and per capita
consumption.
Similarly, the presence of foreign balance constraints
which, even if stabilised by short run output reduction,
pose medium term barriers to future output recovery
across the board (including purely price determined),
making cutbacks in foreign exchange use, is open to
question. Translating Bentham's utilitarian 'pushpin
is as good as poetry' into 'brandy, Mercedes and
foreign travel costs are as good as hoes, dyestuffs for
textiles and staple foods' does not make sense if
production or exports are to be enhanced. There is
increasing consensus that African economies are too
import and too little export intensive and thus no clear
efficiency presumption exists against allocation or
market intervention to direct foreign exchange and/or
domestic credit toward activities likely to raise exports
and substitute for critical imports. The absence or
inadequacy of these is forcing general underutilisation
of capacity.
The appropriate volume, timing and conditions of
external resource flows to achieve stabilisation with
adjustment allowing return to growth is not one on
which the IMF appears to have done systematic
analysis. These questions become more urgent the
longer the lags before production from present
capacity can respond; the greater the time and cost
dimensions of structural adjustment; the poorer (or
more distant) the export prospects; the lower the real
GDP per capita; and the more it has fallen from past
peak levels. The answers would seem to include high
sectoral programme oriented, long term, low interest
finance for a majority of SSA countries - say $15-30
per capita additional resources per year for five years
to carry out stabilisation and structural adjustment. If
that is the case - and the World Bank's prudent debt
management component of Structural Adjustment
Programmes (SAPs?) for low income countries does
encompass these assumptions - then except for the
most robust, net export earning, quick payoff projects,
substantial loans at nine per cent over six years - or
even 10 years - will only worsen the medium
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problems. To be only mildly whimsical, the Bank
should at the least complement its precondition that a
SAP candidate negotiate a Higher Credit Tranche
programme with the Fund with the precondition for a
low or lower middle income candidate that it must not
draw on it.
Tentative Conclusions and Implications
First, because the IMF model's assumptions are
inconsistent with the actual circumstances of almost
all SSA countries, stabilisation programmes built on
them are likely to be to some degree inappropriate.
Second, this may not matter in cases where the country
in question launches stabilisation rapidly with the
advantages of j) recent rises in imports, personal
consumption and government expenditure as well as
reserves or lines of credit; and ii) an improvement in
the external economic environment within a year or 18
months. In these cases, of which Botswana is an
example, quite different assumptions from the IMF's
might well lead to the same programme.
Third, in other cases an IMF type stabilisation
programme is likely to be incomplete, inadequate and
- less certainly - partly in the wrong direction. Its
weaknesses are likely to lie in underestimating - or in
extreme cases overlooking - the importance of real,
sectoral or micro, versus monetary, macro factors; in
placing too little emphasis on supply rebuilding versus
demand constraint; in overestimating the efficiency of
unselective market forces from the point of view of a
recovery in production or the external balance and in
underestimating both the time period needed for
stabilisation and structural adjustment, and the need
to view stabilisation primarily as a part of structural
adjustment, not an end which can be attained by itself.
Fourth, incompleteness and/or inadequacy has
significant costs. These include: substantial delays in
negotiating programmes; a high probability of
programme collapse; a tendency for debate (not least
by critics of the IMF) to concentrate on the IMF's
agenda so that other equally critical questions remain
unexplored and unanalysed (to the detriment of
alternatives) and, in some cases, a rigidity in reaction
to the IMF which slows or blocks genuine stabilisation
measures.8
Fifth, even if the IMF's broad stabilisation policies are
appropriate as the first steps toward structural
e.g. in Tanzania exchange rate adjustment has been lagged by about
one year and lumpier (i.e. fewer, longer changes) than if there had
been no dialogue with the Fund and analysis of its complex impact
on sustainable export crop prices, production subsidy burdens on
the budget, income distribution and their interaction has been
hampered by any such work being categorised more as pro or anti
¡MF than as probably broadly correct or of doubtful accuracy.
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adjustment, six year-nine per cent funding is clearly
inappropriate for low and most lower middle income
countries.
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